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Abstract
We use intraday changes in money market rates to construct indicators of news
about monetary policy stemming separately from policy decisions and from ofﬁcial
communication of the ECB, and study their impact on the yield curve. We show that
communication may lead to substantial revisions in expectations of monetary policy
and, at the same time, exert a signiﬁcant impact on interest rates at longer maturities.
Thereby, the maturity response pattern to communication is hump-shaped, while that
to policy decisions is downward sloping.
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11. Introduction
Recent advances in the theory of monetary policy emphasise that the success of monetary
policy does not depend solely on the effective control of short-term interest rates, but
also on the central bank’s ability to shape market expectations of how interest rates and
inﬂation are likely to evolve over time. Nowhere is this view as concisely summarised
as in Woodford’s widely quoted statement “Not only do expectations about policy matter, but
...very little else matters” (Woodford, 2003, p. 15).
Over the last few decades increased emphasis on transparency and accountability has
led central banks to more open and detailed communication, increasing the potential for
communication to contribute to stabilising private sector expectations about the central
bank’s response to changes in the state of the economy. Central banks have gone to great
length to explain their goals and make their decisions understood by the private sector
and communication has come to be recognised as an important requirement for monetary
policy to be successful (see Blinder et al., 2008, for a survey). In turn, ﬁnancial market
participants have increasingly used central bank communication to revise their expecta-
tions about future short-term interest rates. In constructing indicators of monetary policy
it has therefore become important to capture the information contained in central bank
communication in addition to that contained in interest rate decisions.
The objective of this study is to use high frequency data on money market rates to con-
structmulti-dimensionalindicatorsofmonetarypolicynews(capturingcentralbankcom-
munication and monetary policy decisions) and analyse their impact on the yield curve.
Speciﬁcally, we decompose intraday changes in the euro area money market yield curve
on ECB Governing Council meeting days into news related to the level (and timing) of the
ECB policy interest rate and news related to the future path of monetary policy.
In constructing indicators of monetary policy news relating separately to monetary
policy decision and communication we take advantage of the salient feature that the ECB
announces and explains policy decisions on two different time instances within the same
day. We ﬁnd that news stemming from the communication of ECB monetary policy have
a more substantial and longer-lasting impact on the euro area yield curve than news stem-
ming from decisions.
The contribution of our study is two-fold. First, the institutional feature that the ECB
announces and explains policy decisions on two different points in time during the day al-
lows us to construct direct measures of policy news that relate separately to the decision
and to the communication dimensions. We compare these direct measures with previous
indirect measures that are constructed using econometric techniques on time windows
that contain both decision and communication news, as in the case of the Federal Reserve
studied by G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005) and G¨ urkaynak (2005). These studies show that intra-
day changes in federal fund futures on Federal Open Market Committee meeting days can
be characterised by at least two factors – with one factor relating to the Federal Reserve’s
policy decisions and the other to communication about the future path of policy interest
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Second, we extend existing evidence of the ﬁnancial market impact of the ECB’s mon-
etary policy decisions and communication in a number of dimensions. We provide ﬁrst
evidence of news about ECB monetary policy using multidimensional indicators, result-
ing in a richer description of news about monetary policy compared to studies that focus
on single-factor indicators. A number of studies have used single-factor indicators to
study very short-term news about policy decisions (see Kuttner, 2001, for an early contri-
bution to this literature). These indicators are commonly based on information derived
from (daily) changes in money market interest rates or surveys of ﬁnancial market par-
ticipants. For example, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) use daily changes in the 1-month
EONIA swap rates, while Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003) utilise the difference between
mean expectations of the policy decision among ECB watchers from the Reuters poll one
week before the decision and the actual policy outcome. Other European studies have
used information from EURIBOR futures (see Bernoth and von Hagen, 2004; Wilhelmsen
and Zaghini, 2005)
We also provide ﬁrst evidence of news stemming from ECB communication based on
high frequency money market data. We treat intraday changes in money market yields
around the time of the release of the Governing Council’s interest rate decision and the
press conference as containing all relevant information about changes in monetary policy.
This approach can be justiﬁed by the absence of other relevant data releases during the
narrow time window.
The use of money market data also allows us to identify the news component of
ECB communication without relying on subjective indicators. Several authors have con-
structed indicators based on counting code words in the ECB introductory statement or
the Monthly Bulletin editorial (see Heinemann and Ullrich, 2005; Rosa and Verga, 2005;
Gies, 2005; Meyer, 2004; Gerlach, 2004). Using the indicator developed in Gies (2005), both
Gies (2005) and Sebesty´ en and Sicilia (2005) ﬁnd that the tone of ECB communication has
an impact on both short and long-term interest rates in the euro area. An alternative ap-
proach is taken by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005, 2007a). They construct indicators of the
tone in speeches and statements made by Governing Council members between Govern-
ing Council meetings. These indicators are then used to construct measures of dispersion
about the views of the economic outlook and monetary policy, and to study the implica-
tions for the predictability of monetary policy. However, there are evident shortcomings
to such approaches. The meaning of the subjective indicators may not coincide with how
ﬁnancial markets understand new information about monetary policy. By construction,
subjective indicators cannot possibly reﬂect all the information that is used by ﬁnancial
markets when forming expectations about monetary policy. First, these indicators rely
on the assumption that a central bank uses language and certain code words in a highly
consistent manner. Second, these indicators confound information as to whether the tone
detected in announcements is meant to explain a decision that had been taken, or to pro-
vide signals about an upcoming decision in the next meeting, or about policy actions at
3much longer horizons.1
After constructing a set of multidimensional indicators of monetary policy news, we
utilise these indicators to analyse the impact of monetary policy decisions and commu-
nication on the yield curve. A large literature on announcement effects using US data
documents a signiﬁcant impact of policy decisions and macroeconomic data releases on
long-term yields (see Fleming and Remolona, 1999, and Piazzesi, 2005). We focus on the
impact of policy news on interest rates of different maturities. This aim differs from ear-
lier studies of the euro area that have looked at the impact on volatility. For example,
Sebesty´ en and Sicilia (2005) use daily data and an EGARCH model of volatility for a
number of asset prices with different maturities and ﬁnd that ECB communication re-
sults in increased market volatility. Using intraday data, Andersson et al. (2006) conﬁrm
that volatility in German bond markets increases within tight time windows around the
ECB press conference.
Our results suggest that, according to the size and evolution of indicators of mone-
tary policy news developed in this paper, market participants have recently been in a
better position to anticipate the course of monetary policy than in the past. The results
also suggest that ECB communication during the press conference may result in signif-
icant changes in market expectations of the path of monetary policy. Furthermore, our
results support the use of indirect econometric methods to construct measures of news
from central bank communication. Indeed, our indicators of news corresponding to ECB
communication extracted with the different econometric methodologies give information
that is consistent with the information obtained from a direct measurement on the com-
munication window. Finally, with regards to the impact of monetary policy news on the
yield curve, our results show that changes in expectations of the course of monetary pol-
icy triggered by ECB communication have a statistically signiﬁcant and sizeable impact
on medium to long-term interest rates. At the same time, news about immediate policy
decisions have an impact only at shorter maturities. Speciﬁcally, the maturity response
pattern to communication is hump-shaped, while that to policy decisions is downward
sloping. These results are consistent with those obtained for the US (see G¨ urkaynak, 2005;
G¨ urkaynak et al., 2005).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we motivate different
ways of constructing indicators of monetary policy news relating to different time hori-
zons. To this end, we review in some more detail, how and when the ECB announces and
explains its monetary policy decisions taken at its regular monthly rate-setting meeting
and how money market rates tend to evolve on those days. In Section 3 we describe the
various statistical methods adopted to construct indicators of monetary policy news. In
Section 4 we discuss how the resulting indicators have evolved over time, compare and
validate them by explaining speciﬁc events. Based on these indicators, we provide an
1Our analysis captures the reactions of ﬁnancial market participants to monetary policy announcements
and communication as they are reﬂected in market prices. Information about the underlying thought pro-
cesses that led market participants to react the way they did may be captured by alternative subjective
indicators.
4analysis of the impact of monetary policy news on the euro area yield curve in Section 5.
We conclude in Section 6. A data description and a number of methodological details are
presented in the Appendix.
2. Institutional features of the ECB
The Governing Council – the decision-making body of the ECB – meets regularly on a
monthly basis to discuss monetary policy.2 The release of monetary policy news on Gov-
erning Council meeting days has the following structure. Immediately after the Gov-
erning Council meeting, the ECB publishes its monetary policy decision at 13:45 Central
European Time (CET). The publication consists of a short press release that states which
interset rate decision was taken. Three quarters of an hour later, beginning at 14:30 (CET),
the ECB holds a press conference where the President of the ECB explains this decision in
detail. At the beginning of the press conference the President of the ECB reads an intro-
ductorystatementthatprovidesacomprehensivesummaryoftheassessmentofeconomic
and monetary developments, followed by a short explanation of the decision taken by the
Governing Council. This part of the press conference is usually over by about 14:45 (CET).
After the introductory statement, the President is then available for about half an hour to
answers questions that relate to considerations underlying the policy decision.
The clear separation of how the ECB releases information relating to monetary policy
decisions and communication is a feature that allows us to use different time windows
to construct indicators of monetary policy news. We consider three different time win-
dows. The ﬁrst time window, which we call the “long window” (from 13:35-15:50 (CET)),
captures news relating to both monetary policy decisions and communication of the ECB.
Statistical techniques are then applied to interest rate changes over this long window to
separate news relating to interest rate decisions and communication. In addition to the
“long window”, we consider two narrow time windows – a “decision window” (from
13:35-14:05 (CET)) and a “communication window” (from 14:20-15:50 (CET)). These nar-
row windows allow us to directly isolate the effects of monetary policy news on money
market rates stemming separately from ECB policy decisions and ECB communication
without needing to resort to statistical tools. As such, they provide a natural benchmark
to which the statistically extracted indicators can be compared to. Figure 1 shows a graph-
ical representation of the three time windows that are used. The precise timings of when
the policy decision is published and when the press conference begins are also shown in
Figure 1.
It is instructive here to provide two illustrative episodes of how quickly money market
rates react to monetary policy news from ECB decisions and communication, and how the
constructed time windows capture such news. Figure 2 shows the minute-to-minute evo-
2Since November 2001 the meetings are scheduled for the ﬁrst Thursday of the month. Exceptions occur
during the summer recess and around the turn of the year. Before November 2001, Governing Council
meetingstookplaceatfortnightlyintervals, however, apressconferencefollowedonlyaftertheﬁrstmeeting
of the month.
5lution from 13:35 to 15:50 (CET) of the 60 day rate on two speciﬁc instances.3 The dashed
line (RHS) in Figure 2 shows the evolution on 10 May 2001 when the ECB decided to lower
its key policy interest rates by 25 basis points – a move that had not been anticipated by ﬁ-
nancial markets. Note that it took less than 10 minutes for money market rates to adjust to
the announced change in key ECB interest rates. At the same time money market rates did
not change in response to the explanation of the interest rate decision given subsequently
by the ECB during the press conference starting at 14:30 (CET).
The solid line (LHS) in Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 60 day rate on 6 April 2006,
when interest rates were mainly affected by communication. While ﬁnancial markets had
attached a signiﬁcant probability of an interest rate hike in May 2006, no immediate policy
change was expected at the meeting on 6 April. As there was, in fact, no change in ofﬁcial
interest rates on that day, they remained stable at the time of the publication of the ECB
decision at 13:45 (CET). The ﬁrst ten minutes of the press conference during which the
President read out the Introductory Statement (14:32-14:42 (CET) on that occasion) did
also not show any noticeable changes in money market rates. Yet, following the start of
the questions and answers session, when the President stated that “the current suggestions
regarding the high probability of an increase of rates in our next meeting do not correspond to
the present sentiment of the Governing Council”, money market rates declined visibly. The
60 day rate dropped by about 8 basis points within the next 45 minutes and stabilised at
the lower level roughly an hour after the press conference had started.
These two episodes illustrate the following important observations. Firstly, they show
that the adjustment in market rates takes place immediately after news about monetary
policy becomes available. This observation is consistent with a number of empirical stud-
ies that ﬁnd the euro area money market to be efﬁcient in incorporating new informa-
tion rapidly (see Bernoth and von Hagen, 2004; Hartmann et al., 2001; Sebesty´ en, 2006,
for further evidence in different segments of the euro area money market). Secondly, the
episodes show that our windows are wide enough to capture the time the market needs to
absorb the news, while they are narrow enough to prevent the indicators from becoming
contaminated by other news releases on that day. The only other data that are released
during the time span captured by our time windows are weekly initial unemployment
claims for the US at 14:30 (CET). This release coincides with the beginning of the ECB’s
press conference. Since there could, therefore, potentially exist a difﬁculty in trying to
isolate the effects of monetary policy news relating to ECB communication and US initial
unemployment claims, we provide an assessment of this possibility in Section 3.4.
3. Extracting news from the money market yield curve
We use high frequency changes in money market forward rates to extract indicators of
monetary policy news. An exact description of the data used to construct the changes
in the forward rates is given in Appendix A. In Appendix A we also discuss brieﬂy the
3A description of the data is provided in Appendix A.
6algorithm employed to ﬁlter out erroneous and outdated quotes and provide additional
information regarding the liquidity of the market rates. The sample period covers the
regular Governing Council meeting days from 30 November 2000 through to 5 July 2007.
The policy decision taken at the unscheduled Governing Council meeting on 17 Septem-
ber 2001 was excluded from the sample.
Three different methods are used to extract monetary policy news from changes in
forward rates. These are discussed below. To formalise the different approaches, let f
t
denote the implied 10 day money market forward rate  days ahead, as extracted from
the discount curve. Furthermore, let f
t denote the change in the implied forward rate
over the time window under consideration. Changes in the forward rates 10, 30 and 150
days ahead are thereby labelled as f 10
t , f 30
t and f 150
t . We identify high-frequency
changes in forward rates 30 days ahead as news relating to monetary policy decisions.
This is motivated by the fact that, since November 2001, the Governing Council has been
meeting on a monthly basis to decide on policy interest rates. In this context, notice also
thatwedonotexplicitlydecomposeforwardratechangesathighfrequenciesintochanges
in forward premia and expectations, as at the high frequency changes that we consider the
term premia are assumed to remain constant, leading to a cancelling out effect (see also
the discussion in G¨ urkaynak, 2005, pp. 6-7).
3.1. Rotated Factors
A ﬁrst method of extracting monetary policy indicators relating to different time horizons
corresponds to the factor model approach as employed in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005). Let the
factor model representation for Y be expressed in the following general form
Y = F
0 +  (1)
where Y is a T  N matrix of data, F is a T  k matrix of k unobserved factors with k < N,

0 is a k N matrix of factor loadings and  is a T  N matrix of idiosyncratic disturbance
terms. Matrix 
 contains the eigenvectors of Cov(Y) and F is computed in the standard
way as F = Y
. The Y matrix was chosen to consist of ff 10
t , f 90
t , f 180
t , f 720




t=1. The changes in the forward rates are those corresponding to the long time
window (13:35-15:50 (CET)) and thus cover the policy announcement and the press con-
ference.
We employ the reduced rank test of Cragg and Donald (1997) to determine the mini-
mum number of factors that are necessary to sufﬁciently account for the variation in the
data matrix Y.4 We gave preference to this test, rather than to the more recently proposed
tests by, for example, Bai and Ng (2002), as the column dimension of Y is fairly small. The
asymptotic distribution of these more recent tests relies upon both the T and N dimension
of the data matrix to go to inﬁnity. The results of the reduced rank test are reported in the
4The computational details of this test are outlined in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005, pp. 87-88). We thank Eric
Swanson for providing the Matlab code to perform this test.
7column under the “Long Window” heading in Table B.1 in Appendix B. From the results
reported in Table B.1 it is evident that the null hypothesis that two factors are sufﬁcient to
account for most of the variation in Y cannot be rejected at the 5% level of signiﬁcance.
Since the two factors that we extract from Y have no structural interpretation, we fol-
low the approach in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005) and rotate the factors in such a way that the
ﬁrst one is labelled jump news and the second one, which is restricted so that it does not
load into the short end of the forward curve, path news. That is, changes at the short end of
the forward curve are identiﬁed as jump news, while changes at longer maturities that are
not related to jump news are identiﬁed as path news. The computational details of this
factor rotation are given in Appendix C. Note that, since the original un-rotated factors
obtained from principal component analysis are orthogonal by construction, the rotated
factors are also orthogonal.
3.2. Recursive regressions
The second approach that we employ to construct indicators of monetary policy news
draws on a recursive regression decomposition proposed by G¨ urkaynak (2005). In addi-
tion to the jump and path factors, this decomposition also allows for a third news compo-
nent, which is labelled timing. The rational for this decomposition is as follows. Financial
markets may anticipate a policy move of a certain size by a speciﬁc date. For example,
an anticipated 50 basis points cut in policy interest rates may have been anticipated by a
certain date, but whether it is delivered fully on the ﬁrst meeting within a month, or on
the second meeting within a month, or in two consecutive 25 basis point cuts might not
be fully anticipated.
The three news factors are identiﬁed in the following recursive way. Firstly, the change
in the 30 day forward rate is deﬁned to capture the jump component of monetary policy
news, so that jumpt  f 30
t . The timing component can then be obtained by ﬁltering out
the jump component from the changes in the 10 day forward rate. The path component
is isolated lastly by extracting the jump and timing surprises out of the changes in the
forward rate 5 months ahead. This approach can be formalised by deﬁning timingt and
patht news as the residuals from the following recursive regressions:
f 10
t = 0 +1jumpt + timingt, (2)
f 150
t = 0 +1jumpt +2timingt + patht, (3)
where, f
t is again the change in the 10-day forward rate days ahead over the long time
window.5
As a result of the decomposition, the jump component corresponds to unanticipated
changesinthepolicyinterestrate, whilethetimingcomponentrelatestochangesthatmay
5To evaluate the robustness of the choice of horizons, we have also performed the analysis using 20, 40
and 150 days instead. Both the jump and path news are unaffected by the use of these alternative horizons.
These results are available from the authors upon request.
8have been anticipated in terms of its magnitude, but not in terms of its timing. The path
component captures the effect of changes in money market interest rates of longer-term
maturities that are neither due to jump nor timing surprises. This recursive identiﬁcation
process is similar to that undertaken in the context of VAR models (see G¨ urkaynak, 2005,
pp. 14-15). While, in principle, alternative identifying schemes also appear justiﬁable,
for reasons of comparability with US studies we decided to follow this particular scheme.
The R2 of the regressions in (2) and (3) are 0.60 and 0.25, respectively, indicating that f 10
t
is largely comprised of jump news and f 150
t of path news.
As expected the relevance of timing news within our whole sample is limited. For insti-
tutional reasons instances of non-anticipated interest rate changes at lower-than-monthly
maturities have been rare and are constrained to the sample period prior to November
2001. Since November 2001 the Governing Council has met once a month to discuss in-
terest rates.6 The regressions further suggest that for longer horizons it is important to
clean out the impact of short term news of monetary policy, as a quarter of the changes
in forward rates at, for example, the 150 day horizon are explained by changes at shorter
horizons.
3.3. Separate decision and communication windows
The third approach makes direct use of the salient feature that ECB interest rate decisions
and the explanation of these decisions to the public are 45 minutes apart. Financial mar-
kets know the actual interest rate decision for already three quarters of an hour before the
press conference begins. Any changes in forward rates during the press conference can,
therefore, only be due to communication news and cannot contain news relating to the
jump and/or timing components.
As a viable alternative approach, we thus segregate the measurement period into a
decision and communication window. The ﬁrst window, spanning from 13:35-14:05, is
used to construct jump and timing news that relate to the interest rate decision. That is,
we deﬁne jumpD
t  f 30
t,D and obtain timingD







where D indicates that this change occurs over the time span captured by the decision
window. The R2 of this regression is 0.67. This provides additional conﬁrmation that,
also within the narrow decision window, the relevance of timing news is limited in our
sample.7 The communication window, from 14:20-15:50, is used to get a direct measure
6In Section 4 we show that measured timing news are mostly of an insigniﬁcant size after November
2001. There is only one major exception related to the decoupling of money market rates from the ECB’s
minimum bid rate due to underbidding in the main reﬁnancing operations. Changing the maturities to
decompose timing and jump news at the monthly frequency would come at the cost that the timing news
(which may have been more meaningful at fortnightly frequencies) observed in the pre-2001 period would
be lost.
7This view is further supported by results of a reduced rank test performed on the decision window
9of the path news. This is done by deﬁning f 150
t,C  pathC
t , where C indicates the change
over the communication window.8
On 17 days within our sample period no press conference was held, and hence, in
effect, no path news was measurable. These occasions fall into the pre-November 2001
period during which there were two scheduled Governing Council meetings a month,
with, however, only one press conference after the ﬁrst meeting of the month. As no
ofﬁcial news were released during the communication window, we set news relating to
the path component equal to zero on such days.
3.4. Initial unemployment claims
US weekly initial unemployment claims are published on Thursdays at 14:30 (CET). This
release coincides with the beginning of the press conference held by the ECB. It is, there-
fore, necessary to assess the possibility that weekly initial unemployment claims could
inﬂuence the construction of our indicators of monetary policy news. For the recursive
decomposition approaches outlined in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, we thus included ini-
tialunemploymentclaimsasacontrolvariableintheregressionsin(2), (3)and(4).9 Yetthe
coefﬁcient estimates on initial unemployment claims were not only statistically insigniﬁ-
cant, but also very small. We therefore decided to exclude this variable in the construction
of the regression based surprise measures.
For the rotated factor approach outlined in Section 3.1 we assessed the impact of ini-
tial unemployment claims on the extracted surprises by regressing the rotated path and
jump factors z1 and z2 on initial unemployment claims. This also resulted in statistically
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients. To allow for the possibility of a non-linear impact of initial un-
reported in the column under the “Decisions Window” heading in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The null hy-
pothesis that one factor is sufﬁcient to account for most of the variation in Y cannot be rejected at the 5%
level of signiﬁcance.
8Again we test for the number of relevant factors using the reduced rank test on the communication
window. The results are reported in the column under the “Communication Window” heading in Table B.1
in Appendix B. The null hypothesis that two factors are sufﬁcient to account for most of the variation in
Y cannot be rejected at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. Correlation analysis of the two (unrotated) factors
shows that the ﬁrst factor, accounting for more than half of the variance, is closely related to both the direct
measure of communication (with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.85) and both indirect measures of path news
(with correlation coefﬁcients of 0.52 and 0.65). This supports our view that most of the changes occurring
during the communication window relate to communication about monetary policy relevant for the future
path of interest rates. In contrast, the second factor is not correlated with any of the measures of monetary
policy news. We therefore speculate that the second factor may reﬂect the remaining impact of other news,
such as occasional releases of macroeconomic data, occurring during the communication time window.
Neither factor is correlated with the ﬁrst (unrotated) factor from the decision window, suggesting that the
path news that we measure from the communication window are not contaminated by the possible impact
of lingering decision news. Note that there exists no statistical evidence pointing to the need to allow for
more than three factors in any of the time windows.
9Due to different timing of moving to daylight saving in Europe and in the US there exist three occasions
when the US initial unemployment claims data are released at 13:30 (CET) instead of 14:30 (CET). Since the
release of the data on these three occasions occurs outside our considered time windows, we set the values
on those occasions to zero.
10employment claims on the news components, we further inspected cross-plots of z1 and
z2 against initial unemployment claims, with a super imposed non-parametric regression
ﬁt. We found no evidence of a non-linear relationship between the extracted surprises and
initial unemployment claims. We therefore concluded that the construction of our mone-
tary policy surprises was not contaminated by the release of initial unemployment claims
in the US on that day.
4. Evolution of monetary policy news over time
4.1. Main results
The resulting three sets of multi-dimensional indicators of monetary policy news are plot-
ted in Figure 3. Panels (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 3 show the indicators obtained from the ro-
tated factors, the recursive regressions and the two narrow decision and communication
windows, respectively. Positive entries denote, in percentage points, an unanticipated
tightening of money market rates for each of the respective monetary policy surprises.
These are jump and timing at the short end of the money market yield curve, and path
relating to changes in expectations about the course of monetary policy several months
out.
It is evident from Figure 3 that on average, the total size of monetary policy news
appears to be relatively small. Across the methods the average of the absolute surprise
component ranges between 1.4 and 2.8 basis points for jump and between 2.0 and 4.1 for
path indicators. As expected, surprises related to timing are on average smaller (approx-
imately 1 basis point). The size of the news indicators, in particular with regards to those
related to monetary policy decisions, seems to have declined over the years, potentially
reﬂecting improved short-term predictability of ECB interest rate decisions over time (see
also Blattner et al., 2008). Indeed, the largest jump indicators are concentrated in the ﬁrst
twoyearsofthesampleperiod. Conversely, sincethebeginningof2002, pathnewsappear
to have become relatively more important.
A comparison of the indicators across all methods shows a high degree of consistency.
For example, the jump surprise from the rotated factor approach is strongly positively cor-
related with the jump news from the recursive regressions, with a correlation coefﬁcient
of 0.77. Path news extracted from the indirect statistical methods are closely related to the
path measure constructed directly from the narrow communication window. This can be
seen from Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4, which show the direct path measure cross-plotted
against path news computed from the factor model and the recursive regressions, respec-
tively. The correlations corresponding to these cross-plots are 0.61 and 0.65. Also, for the
majority of the 17 occasions when no ofﬁcial ECB press conference was held, and hence
when path news from the communication window were set to zero, path news extracted
from the statistical methods were very small. Overall, the evidence suggests that the sta-
tistical methods for computing communication news of monetary policy are consistent
with the direct path measure constructed from the communication window.
11In order to verify that our surprise measures correspond to news about monetary pol-
icy, we have performed a robustness analysis and construct indicators from changes in
forward rates over the same time windows on Thursdays when no Governing Council
meetings took place. The surprises constructed on such non-Governing-Council meeting
days are substantially smaller, yielding average absolute surprises ranging between 0.3
and 0.6 basis points for jump and 0.7 and 1.1 for path news, respectively. These results are
indicative of our conjecture that movements in forward rates on Governing Council meet-
ing days are largely due to news about monetary policy. Note that these results are also
in line with the ﬁndings reported in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) who study market
reactions to ECB press conferences.
4.2. Interpreting speciﬁc events
Our measures of monetary policy news are consistent with a narrative approach to spe-
ciﬁcepisodesinformedbyknowledgeaboutmonetarypolicyandmacroeconomiccircum-
stances. To illustrate this, we plot snapshots of the money market yield curve, over 1 to
150 days to maturity, on 10 May 2001, 1 April 2004 and 11 April 2001 in Panels (a) to (c)
in Figure 5. The three time instances that we look at are 13:35, 14:05 (corresponding to
before and after the announcement of the policy decision), and 15:50 (marking the end of
the press conference).
Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows an example of an episode where the three different method-
ologies consistently bear out the same nature of news. The ECB cut ofﬁcial interest rates
by 25 basis points on 10 May 2001, which had not been priced in by ﬁnancial markets. The
parallel downward shift in the money market curve following that decision is consistently
identiﬁed as jump news by all three approaches. As is evident from Panel (a) of Figure 5,
this adjustment took place within the time of the “decision window”. The money market
curve did not move at all during the “communication window”, suggesting that market
expectations regarding the path of monetary policy remained unaltered on the basis of
information provided during the press conference.
Between June 2003 and November 2005 there were no changes in ECB policy interest
rates. While ﬁnancial markets do not appear to have been surprised by the actual interest
ratedecisionsassuchduringthisperiod, ourmeasuressuggestthatsomere-adjustmentof
expectations about the future path of interest rates took place in response to ECB commu-
nication. For example, in the Spring of 2004, macroeconomic data indicating only modest
growth in euro area economic activity and a number of shocks (including, amongst others,
the March terrorist attacks in Madrid and excessive exchange rate volatility) led markets
to attach a higher probability to interest rate cuts at some point, although no immediate
change was expected at the Governing Council meeting of 1 April 2004. Policy interest
rates did, in fact, remain unchanged at that meeting. However, as the Introductory State-
ment to the press conference was read out, the remark that the current monetary policy
stance remained in line with price stability triggered an upward shift in the money market
curve at longer maturities (see Panel (b) of Figure 5). This shift is consistently identiﬁed
12as positive path news across all three methods.
While the indicators from the three different approaches provide overall consistent
information about monetary policy news, there exist a few occasions where they were not
fullyaligned. Forinstance, theperiodaroundearly2001, markingthebeginningofaseries
of cuts in policy interest rates, was characterised by relatively large volatility in measured
news. Although there was no cut in ofﬁcial interest rates on 11 April 2001, changes in
money market rates nevertheless appear to suggest that ﬁnancial markets had expected a
cut in ofﬁcial rates. The tone of the ECB at the press conference was perceived by many
as signalling a “wait and see” attitude, leading to an upward revision of expectations
about future rates in monetary policy. On this particular instance, while the three different
surprisemeasurescorrectlyidentifythechangesinthemoneymarketcurveas“tightening
news”, they were associated with timing news from the recursive regression approach
as well as from the separate time windows, and to jump news from the rotated factor
approach.
This inconsistency in the surprise measures is due to the following. The episode in
spring2001fallsintoaperiodduringwhichtheshort-endofthemoneymarketyieldcurve
was affected by underbidding in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations. This is evident
from Panel (c) of Figure 5, which shows the money market yield curve and the ECB’s
minimum bid rate marked by the (red) horizontal line. Notice how money market rates of
shortermaturitieswerelargelydetachedfromtheleveloftheminimumbidrate. Asimilar
episode occurred in March 2003. The impact of underbidding on money market interest
rates varied across maturities. Since the indicators do not build on the same information
set, but rather rely on yields of different maturities, the results are not entirely conclusive
on these few occasions.
Overall, the quantitative description of changes in policy expectations from the con-
structed indicators match a judgemental assessment – informed by macroeconomic de-
velopments and the substance of ECB communication – of market developments. This
supports the use of these indicators as a promising and coherent tool to analyse the re-
sponse of assets prices to the different types of monetary policy news.
5. Impact of monetary policy news on longer-term yields
ECB Governing Council meeting days are widely regarded as special events by ﬁnancial
markets because of their ability to trigger comparatively strong reactions in bond and
stock prices. For US data, there exists a large literature on announcement effects which
documents a signiﬁcant impact of policy decisions and macroeconomic data releases on
long-term yields. For example, on the basis of afﬁne term-structure models, using high
frequency data as in Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Piazzesi (2005), the literature has
identiﬁed a hump-shaped maturity response pattern in relation to macroeconomic news
and a downward-sloping pattern in relation to monetary policy announcements. How-
ever, this analysis has largely been restricted to modelling monetary policy in terms of
13changes in policy interest rates, neglecting information on monetary policy relating to
longer horizons. In the following, using the multi-dimensional indicators developed in
theprevioussection, weanalysetheimpactofECBmonetarypolicyonlonger-termyields.
We also provide a comparison of our results to those obtained in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005)
and G¨ urkaynak (2005) for the US.
To assess the impact of monetary policy on yields, we run the following sequence of
regressions
y
t = 0It +"t (5)
where y
t is the change in the days ahead yield, 8  = 60,70,80,...,3650, viz, over the
long time window, including the decision and press conference. Including a constant, It
consists of the monetary policy indicators obtained from using the methods described in
Section 3. As discussed previously, due to US initial unemployment claims being released
within this time window, we included initial unemployment claims (jobst) as a control
variable in It. It thus takes the from It = (1, jumpt,timingt, patht, jobst)
0.
As shown earlier, the elements of It are constructed variables. When computing stan-
dard errors of the estimate of  it thus becomes important to account for the extra sample
variation that arises from this construction. We compute the standard errors in two dif-
ferent ways. First, for the factor based approach, we resort to re-sampling techniques. We
use a non-parametric bootstrap to compute conﬁdence bounds for  in (5).10 The results
from regressing jump and path news on y
t for maturities  = 60,70,80,...,3650 with
bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals are shown in Figure 6. Second, for the sequential
regressions in (2), (3) and (5), we derive asymptotic conﬁdence bands. Since the sequen-
tial regressions can be thought of as a sequential Method of Moments (MOM) estimation
problem, it is possible to derive the correct asymptotic variance of  analytically, taking
account of the multiple estimation steps.11 The derivation of this asymptotic variance is
provided in Appendix D. Figure 7 below shows the estimates of the effects of jump, timing
and path news on y
t for maturities,  = 60,70,80,...,3650 together with 95% asymp-
totic conﬁdence bounds. Lastly, the impact of monetary policy news on yield changes
from the two narrow windows is presented in Figure 8, also with 95% asymptotic conﬁ-
dence bands.
We summarise the results of the impact of monetary policy surprises on the yield curve
by reporting point estimates and regression R2 over a range of different maturities in Ta-
ble 1. The maturities of the yields were chosen to correspond to those considered by
10We employed two approaches in the non-parametric bootstrap. First, we treated the data as if they were
iid. Second, we utilised a block bootstrap procedure to ensure that neighbouring news components were
drawn together. This was done to preserve the structure of the components during certain volatile periods.
Drawing blocks of size three lead to adequate re-sampling properties. However, there were no noticeable
differences in the size of the standard errors (or the shape of the distribution) between the block bootstrap
procedure and the standard iid one. We therefore decided to only report the results based on the iid draws.
Bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals were computed as the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles from 10000 draws.
11Notethatforthefactorbasedmodelabove, itis, inprinciple, alsopossibletowritedownasetofmoment
conditions for the estimation of the factors. However, it is not clear how the rotation of the factors impacts
on the variance.
14G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005) and G¨ urkaynak (2005) for the US. Their regression results are also
reported in Table 1 to provide a comparison. In addition to the regression results we pro-
vide a variance decomposition which shows the contribution of each surprise component
to the R2. Since in a simple regression with one explanatory variable the R2 corresponds to
the proportion of variance that is explained by the regressors, we can think of the individ-
ual squared correlations between the yield changes and the regressors as a decomposition
of the R2. This is possible here because the individual news components in the regres-
sions are by construction orthogonal to each other.12 Notice from the results reported in
Table 1 that the sum of the contributions to R2 do not exactly add up to the R2. This is
due to the initial unemployment claims variable (Jobs) being included in the regressions
which, although only very mildly correlated with the news components, is nevertheless
not orthogonal by construction.13
The results reported in Table 1 show that overall the different dimension of mone-
tary policy news are crucial in distinguishing how monetary policy affects the yield curve
across the maturity spectrum. Jump and path news have similar impacts at shorter ma-
turities and account for nearly all of the explained variance in the impact regressions (as
shown by their contributions to the regression R2). Jump news tend to have an impact
predominantly on short to medium-term maturities and exhibit a downward-sloping ma-
turity response pattern. Timing news are mostly insigniﬁcant, except for the shortest ma-
turities. Finally, irrespective of the method used to extract news about the future path
of interest rates, path news have a statistically signiﬁcant and sizeable impact across all
maturities and exhibit a hump-shaped maturity response pattern. As these news mainly
related to ECB communication during the press conference, our results point to a signif-
icant role for central bank communication in shaping the impact of monetary policy on
ﬁnancial markets.
A comparison of the indicators across methods shows a high degree of consistency.
This is especially the case for the factor-based approach, where there is a close method-
ological match between our study and the results obtained in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005). Yet,
unlike in the US, the timing component turns out to be irrelevant.
In line with previous literature on announcement effects (e.g. Fleming and Remolona,
1999; G¨ urkaynak et al., 2005; G¨ urkaynak, 2005), the regressions in (5) involve yields to
maturity on the left-hand side. Therefore, in addition to an independent impact of news,
changes in yields at longer maturities might also simply reﬂect changes in expected short-
term rates at shorter maturities. Therefore, as a robustness check we compare our yield
curve regressions with regressions on forward rates. Speciﬁcally, we run the sequence
of regressions in (5) with y
t replaced by f
t – the implied forward rate changes – on
12For the partitioned decision and communication windows, only the jump and timing components are
orthogonal by construction. The correlation between path and jump and timing components are respec-
tively 0.11 and 0.12. The difference between the sum of the individual contributions to the R2 and the R2 is,
as a consequence of this correlation, thus somewhat larger.
13The correlation between Jobs and the individual news components extracted from the three approaches
range from -0.05 to 0.14.
15the left-hand side of the equation. While these regression coefﬁcients, of course, exhibit
some volatility across maturities, their qualitative pattern is consistent with that of the
yield regressions reported above. In particular, path news impact directly on forward
rates at future dates up to 10 years ahead with a statistically signiﬁcant positive sign. The
forward rate regressions also show that jump news impact directly on short term rates at
future dates up to 2 years ahead, whereas timing news are largely irrelevant. The resulting
sequence of parameter estimates and corresponding regression R2 are shown in Table 2.
6. Conclusions
We use high-frequency money market data on monetary policy days to construct multidi-
mensional indicators of news about ECB monetary policy and study their impact on the
euro area yield curve. Our analysis contributes in two ways to the existing literature on
the ﬁnancial market impact of monetary policy decisions and communication.
First, we exploit the institutional feature that the ECB announces and explains its
monetary policy decisions on two different time instances during the day of rate-setting
meetings. This allows us to validate existing econometric approaches of decomposing
changes in the money market yield curve over a long time window (comprising decision
and communication events) to indirectly construct indicators that capture the decision
and the communication dimensions separately. Our results support the use of these in-
direct econometric methods in constructing measures of news from central bank commu-
nication. Indeed, the news indicators relating to ECB communication extracted from the
different econometric methodologies give information that is highly consistent with the
information from the direct approach.
Second, we take a more comprehensive approach to analysing the ﬁnancial market im-
pact of the ECB’s policy decisions and communication than in the current literature, which
is primarily based on single-factor indicators and subjective measures of the tone of ECB
statements. Our results suggest that market expectations of the path of monetary policy
may change considerably during the ECB’s press conference. Moreover, these changes
have a sizeable impact on longer-term yields. While immediate policy decisions have a
downward-sloping maturity response pattern, changes in expectations of monetary pol-
icy at longer horizons triggered by ECB communication have a hump-shaped maturity
response pattern, with a more pronounced impact on longer-term yields. We ﬁnd that the
size of the impact on yields in the euro area is similar to that measured for the US. Our
results show that news stemming from ECB communication matter more for long-term
interest rates – crucial for the transmission of monetary policy – than news about actual
monetary policy decisions.
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We are grateful to Vincent Brousseau for providing the yield curve data used throughout
this study. The yield curve has been constructed using Reuters real time quotes of deposit
rates (of maturity up to one week), overnight interest rate swaps (OIS, of maturity 1 week
to 2 years), and swap rates (of maturity 1 to 10 years).14 Figure A.1 shows how many
quotes are available for each of these three instruments at various maturities (within the
whole set of data available). The zero coupon yield curve has been constructed recur-
sively using bootstrapping techniques and a Fama-Bliss type of interpolation scheme as





































































































































Deposits O I S Swap
FIGURE A.1: The number of quotes contained in the database across the three instruments at
various maturities.
Erroneous or outdated quotes have been ﬁltered out using the algorithm described in
Brousseau (2006, pp. 72-82). The algorithm involves three steps: Firstly, a ‘retroactive’
ﬁlter is applied to remove isolated quotes that are markedly different from a majority of
preceding and subsequent quotes. Secondly, a ‘simple’ ﬁlter is used rejecting any data
that imply the logarithm of their ratio over the previous mid price to be higher than 0.002.
Lastly, a ‘dynamical’ ﬁlter is employed consisting of the following steps: (1) Sorting the
quotes of banks in chronological order; (2) Computing the best bid and the best ask for
14These rates are deﬁned as follows: A deposit rate is the interest rate at which term deposits are offered
by one bank to another. An overnight interest rate swap is an interest rate swap transaction, whereby one
party agrees to receive or pay a ﬁxed rate to another party, against paying or receiving a ﬂoating rate pegged
to the EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average). A swap rate is an interest rate swap transaction, whereby
one party agrees to receive or pay a ﬁxed rate to another party, against paying or receiving a ﬂoating rate
pegged to three or six-month money market interest rates (EURIBOR – Euro Interbank Offered Rate).
20the n most recent banks; (3) Stopping when the best bid is equal to or bigger than the best
ask price; (4) Eliminating quotes of bank n, as well as less recent ones. (5) Taking the best
bid and best ask for the n   1 remaining banks.
Except for very few instances at the beginning of the sample, this procedure yields an
extremely smooth yield curve (see also Brousseau and Sahel, 2002). To those observations
we have applied the B form of a smoothing spline — as described in James and Webber
(2004, pp. 437-444). In the main body of the paper y
t refers to the yield to maturity  as
given by the resulting zero-coupon curve. Forward rates of 10-day maturity  periods
ahead f
t are derived from that zero-coupon curve.
B. Factor test
The factor test of Cragg and Donald (1997) tests the null hypothesis that Y was generated
by h0 factors against the alternative hypothesis h > h0. This test is performed on all three
time windows that we consider. The results are reported in Table B.1 below.
TABLE B.1: Cragg and Donald (1997) Factor test.
h0
Long Window Decision Window Communication Window
test stat. 2 DF p value test stat. 2 DF p value test stat. 2 DF p value
0 59.93 15 0.0000 32.68 15 0.0052 49.19 15 0.0000
1 19.33 9 0.0225 14.43 9 0.1077 20.62 9 0.0144
2 4.24 4 0.3749 6.24 4 0.1823 4.14 4 0.3869
Notes: Y consists of the current, 3 months, 6 months, 2 years, 5 years and 10 years changes in forward rates
around the policy window. Note that a model with 3 factors can account for all the variation in the data,
leading to singularity in the design matrix of the test. The largest h0 that we considered, therefore, was up
to 2.
C. Factor rotation
The notation in this section follows the one in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005) on pages 90 to
91. Let the rotated factors Z be related to the base set of factors F through the following
relationship








and U is an orthogonal matrix. U is identiﬁed by a number of restrictions. These are, unit
length of the columns of U, orthogonality of the columns of Z = (z1, z2), ie. E(z1z2) =
0 = 11 +22. We also need the restriction that z2 does not inﬂuence (or load into)
21f 10
t , so that 21  12 = 0, where 1 and 2 are entries (1,1) and (2,1) in the 2  N
matrix 
0, viz, the loadings of f 10
t on the two factors f1 and f2. Also, z
1 and z
2 are
re-scaled in such a way that z1 and z2 move one to one with f 10
t and f 360
t , respectively.
A preliminary set of unstandardised but rotated factors is then computed as
z
1 = 1f1 +2f2 (C.3)
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These are then standardised according to z1 = 1z
1 and z2 =
2
1z
2 where1,2, and1 are
coefﬁcient estimates from the regressions
f 10
t = 0 +1z
1 +1,t (C.5)
f 360
t = 0 +1z
1 +2z
2 +2,t (C.6)
so that we ﬁnally obtain the rotated and standardised factors Z = (z1, z2).
D. Asymptotic variance
To illustrate the derivation of the asymptotic variance of  we adopt, for reasons of sim-
plicity, the following notation. We deﬁne t and st as respectively timingt and patht news,
and then use the following compact notation on equations (2) and (3)
f 10
t = 0x1t +t (D.1)
f 150
t = 0x2t + st (D.2)




0 and x2t =0, with  = (0,0)
0 being the
set of ﬁrst stage estimation parameters corresponding to x1t and x2t. Note that f 30
t was
given the jump news label earlier. Writing (5) compactly as
yt = 0x3t +"t (D.3)




0 with 1 being a vector of constants and
jt the control variable for US jobless claims data being released during the same time
interval. A consistent and asymptotically unbiased estimate of  using OLS as long as
22the standard moment conditions of OLS are satisﬁed. We will assume that that is the case
here. The problem, however, is to get the correct variance of , which, in general, will not
be E[x3tx0
3t]
 1 Var["t], due to t and st being constructed variables, unless one can show
that the expected value of the derivatives of the moment conditions of the last regression
step in (D.3) is zero when taken with respect to the true parameter vector.
The problem can, in fact, be thought of as a standard sequential MOM estimation prob-
lem, as set out in Pagan (1984), Newey (1984) and Pagan (1986). The primary concern here
is that  and  in (D.1) and (D.2), respectively, are unknown and are replaced by consis-
tent estimates. Therefore, estimation of  in (D.3) is subject to additional sample varia-
tion. Using the assumption of exogenous regressor, implicit to OLS regressions, one can
formulate a standard set of moment conditions and think about deriving the asymptotic
variance matrix of  within a MOM framework. Denoting by ft,gt and ht the vectors of
moment conditions for the regressions in equations (D.1), (D.2), and (D.3) respectively, it
can be shown that the asymptotic variance matrix of  takes the form
 = Var() + H 1
 H [	] H0
H 1
 (D.4)




























 = Var() + GVar() G0.
Var() 8 = , and  is a Newey and West (1987) type heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix formed from the OLS regressions in (D.1) to
(D.2) when ignoring the fact that we have constructed variables. Letting (3) denote the
third element of , ie., the coefﬁcient on t, and using this notation henceforth to denote
element entries, it can be shown that H takes the form
H =
2
































































to be the cross-product
moment matrix of x3t.
23For an easy way to derive the variance of  as in (D.4) consider the following set up.
Let  =
 
0,00 and = (0,0)
0 where, and  are as deﬁned above. For notational
simplicity we will let Xt represent all the relevant data entries. Also, we will in general
suppress the dependence of the moment conditions on the data and parameter vectors
and hence write, for example, E[mt] instead of E[mt (Xt,)]. The following partitioned































From standard MOM theory we have that
p
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  ˆ   0
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dueto ft beingafunctionof onlyand gt notbeingafunctionof. 
 = Var(T 1=2 å
T
t=1 mt)
can be computed using a standard Newey and West (1987) HAC covariance matrix. We





































24Given the nature of the sequential regressions, we also know that, by construction of
the ﬁrst regression steps, st and t are orthogonal to"t and are assumed uncorrelated over




= 0,8j > 1, we can set 
gf = 
hf = 
hg = 0, so that (D.11)
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are just the standard HAC type covariance matrices of  and ,
denoted respectively by Var() and Var() from the ﬁrst and second step regressions,












which simpliﬁes to (D.6) once these expectations are taken with respect to the true param-
eter vectors  and.
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6 April, 2006 (LHS) 10 May, 2001 (RHS)
FIGURE 2: Intraday developments in the 60-day yield to maturity on 10 May 2001 and 6 April 2006.
The vertical lines at 13:45 and 14:30 indicate the release of the monetary policy decision and the start




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) Monetary Policy News extracted from the partitioned decision and communication windows.
FIGURE 3: Extracted jump, timing, and path news of Monetary Policy. The shaded area marks the
period between 30 November 2000 and 8 November 2001 during which Governing Council meetings
took place at fortnightly intervals. The only exception is the 30 August 2001 meeting where there were 4












































(b) Path from recursive regressions against communication window
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(c) 11 April 2001
FIGURE 5: Money market rates as of 13:35, 14:05, 15:50 hours on various dates.













(a) Impact of the jump factor z1 on changes in yields with bootstrapped conﬁdence bounds













(b) Impact of the path factor z2 on changes in yields with bootstrapped conﬁdence bounds
FIGURE 6: Impact of news from the rotated factors from principal component analysis on yields at
maturities  = 60,70,80,...,3650 (based on wide time window).













(a) Impact of jump news on changes in yields with corrected asymptotic 95% conﬁdence bounds













(b) Impact of timing news on changes in yields with corrected asymptotic 95% conﬁdence bounds













(c) Impact of path news on changes in yields with corrected asymptotic 95% conﬁdence bounds
FIGURE 7: Impact of news from recursive regression analysis on yields of maturities  =
60,70,80,...,3650 (based on wide time window).










































FIGURE 8: Impact of news from recursive regression analysis on yields of maturities  =
60,70,80,...,3650 (based on the the partitioned decision and communication windows).
34TABLE 1: Comparison of  estimates from US and Euro (EUR) data.
Maturity Country
Factor Analysis Recursive Regressions Partitioned Windows
Jump Path Jobs R2 Jump Timing Path Jobs R2 Jump Timing Path Jobs R2
1/2 Year US         0.60 0.35 0.38   0.81          
180 Day EUR 0.35 0.38 0.01
0.90
0.65 0.04 0.54 0.00
0.98
0.55 0.18 0.50  0.01
0.71
Contribution to R2 0.35 0.55 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.30 0.17 0.45 0.00
2 Year US 0.48 0.41   0.94 0.64 0.10 0.96   0.69          
720 Day EUR 0.33 0.44  0.02
0.84
0.53 0.07 0.57  0.03
0.70
0.14  0.01 0.76  0.03
0.57
Contribution to R2 0.24 0.59 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.37 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.53 0.03
5 Year US 0.28 0.37   0.80 0.40  0.01 0.81   0.45          
1800 Day EUR 0.17 0.38  0.02
0.76
0.29  0.01 0.47  0.03
0.55
0.04  0.09 0.64  0.03
0.53
Contribution to R2 0.10 0.64 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.37 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.48 0.05
10 Year US 0.13 0.28   0.74 0.22 0.02 0.60   0.32          
3650 Day EUR 0.03 0.22  0.03
0.45
0.07  0.03 0.23  0.03
0.26
 0.10  0.14 0.45  0.03
0.47
Contribution to R2 0.01 0.38 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.35 0.08
Notes: Bold entries denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Figures for the US entries are taken from Table 5 in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005) and Table 3 in G¨ urkaynak
(2005). Contributions to R2 are the squared correlations between the yield changes and the regressors.
3
5TABLE 2: Forward rate regressions results.
Days to Factor Analysis Recursive Regressions Partitioned Windows
Maturity Jump Path Jobs R2 Jump Timing Path Jobs R2 Jump Timing Path Jobs R2
180 Day 0.15 0.67 0.02 0.90 0.55  0.29 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.56  0.22 0.50  0.00 0.62
720 Day 0.29 0.61  0.02 0.88 0.56  0.06 0.75  0.04 0.66 0.34  0.03 0.76  0.04 0.35
1800 Day 0.17 0.26  0.03 0.44 0.21 0.10 0.28  0.04 0.26 0.10  0.01 0.64  0.03 0.34
3650 Day  0.14 0.18  0.02 0.14  0.06  0.08 0.19 0.01 0.06  0.01  0.07 0.45 0.02 0.05
Notes: Bold entries denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
3
6